The Extraordinary Rise and Sudden Decline of Law School Tuition: A Case Study of Veblen Effects in Higher Education by Campos, Paul F.




The Extraordinary Rise and Sudden Decline of Law 
School Tuition: A Case Study of Veblen Effects in 
Higher Education 
Paul F. Campos* 
I.INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 167 
II.THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL TUITION FROM THE 1950S 
TO PRESENT DAY ................................................................... 169 
III.THE CONCEPT OF A VEBLEN GOOD AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
RECENT TUITION HISTORY OF ONE LAW SCHOOL ................ 174 
IV.VEBLEN GOODS AS EXPLAINED BY TUITION HISTORY IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION ............................................................................ 179 
V.A NEW ERA: AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR DECREASING 




Thirty years ago, John Kramer looked back over the previous two 
decades of rapid growth in the cost of attending law school, and made a 
sobering prediction: 
Law schools for the last twenty years have been testing the 
elasticity of demand for their product. As tuition has increased 
each year, outpacing even the rate of inflation, law schools have 
been pressing toward the point where significant numbers of 
college graduates may decide that it makes good economic sense 
to seek less expensive forms of graduate education or forgo 
additional credentials altogether.1 
On the other hand, Kramer noted that despite this startling increase in 
tuition, the demand for legal education had proven remarkably insensitive to 
rapidly rising prices: “Research to date has yielded no firm answer to the 
 
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado.  The author thanks Orin Kerr, Deborah Merritt, 
William Ian Miller, and Brian Tamanaha for comments and suggestions.   
 1  John R. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, by Whom, and How?, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 240 (1987).   
CAMPOS_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  11:00 AM 
168 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:167 
question of how elastic the demand for legal education is.  Superficial 
evidence, however, suggests that demand has proven amazingly inelastic 
with reference to price.”2 
The three decades after Kramer published his piece would constitute a 
natural, ongoing experiment with regard to the elasticity of the demand for 
legal education.  Over this time, law schools would continue to raise tuition 
at a dizzying pace, eventually reaching levels that, it is safe to say, would 
have astounded Kramer had he foreseen them when he addressed the issue 
in 1987. 
This Article attempts to give a partial answer to the question of why, 
over a period of several decades, American law schools were able to 
continually raise tuition far faster than the rate of inflation.  My thesis is that 
from at least the middle of the 1950s until the early years of the present 
decade, law school tuition often displayed the characteristics of a Veblen 
good, a good for which demand increases as price increases.3  I then argue 
that over the past few years, what I call the “law school reform movement” 
has made it increasingly difficult for law schools to market their credentials 
as Veblen goods.  As a result, after more than half a century of constant 
increases, real law school tuition has suddenly fallen significantly. 
Part II of this Article reviews the history of American law school tuition 
from the 1950s to the present day.  Part III examines the concept of a Veblen 
good and looks in detail at the tuition history of one law school over a fifteen-
year period to help illustrate that concept.  Part IV considers how this tuition 
history helps explain the causal mechanisms that produce Veblen goods, 
especially in higher education.  Part V reveals that, over the past five years 
or so, American law schools have moved into a new era—one featuring 
falling rather than rising prices—and it analyzes some possible causes of this 
sudden and startling reversal of a trend that has lasted more than half a 







 2  Id.   
 3  I acknowledge that there are difficulties with implicitly framing the economics of legal 
education in terms of a neoclassical market, in which individuals (law school applicants) are 
trying to maximize utility and firms (law schools) are attempting to maximize profit.  For 
example, it is certainly the case that the people running the “firms” in this market generally 
reject the idea that they are pursuing profit maximization.  Discussing the many interesting 
issues raised by this disjunction is beyond the scope of this Article.   
CAMPOS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2017  11:00 AM 
2017] VEBLEN EFFECTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION  169  
II. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL TUITION FROM THE 1950S 
TO PRESENT DAY 
In 1954, the Association of American Law Schools commissioned a 
report on the state of American legal education.  The report was eventually 
published in 1961,4 containing data regarding tuition charged at 121 of the 
Association’s 129 members during the 1956-1957 academic year.  The report 
found that the median annual resident tuition and fees charged to full-time 
students by these schools was $475.5  This covered a range of $50 to $1,050.  
Public law schools charged a median resident tuition of $204.6 
Of course, these nominal dollar amounts do not reflect sixty years of 
subsequent inflation.  When the prices are adjusted to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index, the median tuition charged by law schools in 1956-
1957 becomes $4,191 in 2016 dollars, with a range of $441 to $9,265.7  
Interestingly, Harvard Law School charged $7,558 in 2016 dollars: nearly 
20% less than the most expensive law school at the time.8  Public school 
median tuition was $1,800 in 2016 dollars. 
Contemporary observers, especially those currently paying law school 
tuition, may take a certain mordant amusement from the study’s authors’ 
observations regarding the latest data from 1959-1960, indicating that tuition 
was continuing to rise: 
[D]ata available would seem to establish a strong upward trend 
reaching toward tolerable limits in view of the circumstances that 
the charges are largely being made to students in their seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth years of formal education, following 
upon considerable antecedent expense for schooling. This upward 
trend in charges to students should hardly further be encouraged 
by this report.9 
Despite the study’s cautionary conclusion, this upward trend continued, 
and to such a remarkable extent that in 1987, thirty years after the study’s 
data was collected, John Kramer, the then dean of Tulane University Law 
 
 4  ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS. SPECIAL COMM. ON LAW SCH. ADMIN. & UNIV. RELATIONS, 
ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ADEQUACY AND 
MOBILIZATION OF CERTAIN RESOURCES IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS (1961), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4087946;view=1up;seq=9 [hereinafter ANATOMY 
OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION].   
 5  Id. at 80.   
 6  Id.   
 7  Inflation adjustments are based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Consumer 
Price Index. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) (online 
calculator).   
 8  OFFICIAL REGISTER OF HARVARD UNIV., THE CATALOGUE OF THE LAW SCHOOL 1956-
1957 94 (1956).   
 9  ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 4, at 81–82.   
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School, warned that the cost of legal education would soon put law school 
beyond the reach of non-wealthy Americans, along with a small number of 
others receiving significant need-based scholarship aid.  He also suggested 
that spiraling costs would affect the educational value of law school and the 
career goals of law graduates: 
The seats may be full in most law schools today. They may remain 
full tomorrow. They may even remain full until the year 2000 or 
beyond. But those seats may be filled almost exclusively by the 
sons and daughters of rich and upper-middle class white families 
and a handful of black and brown students from relatively 
impoverished backgrounds who receive substantial grants. 
Moreover, the seats may be filled in name only after the first year, 
with even the sons and daughters of the well-to-do working twenty 
hours a week in local law offices during the semester and forty 
hours a week during their summer “vacations.” Finally, the seats 
may be filled with many more students who, as they become 
lawyers, do so with the single-minded objective of milking the 
profession for all it is worth in order to be able to pay 
retrospectively for their legal education.10 
What alarmed Kramer was the extent to which increases in law school 
tuition were outstripping even the notable spike in the cost of undergraduate 
education.  “While college costs have climbed rapidly, law school costs have 
leaped,” he wrote.11  He then catalogued the latter’s increases between the 
1974-1975 and 1986-1987 school years. 
Between 1974-1975 and 1986-1987, median tuition at private law 
schools increased from $2,350 to $8,042.12  Resident median tuition at public 
law schools had grown from $673 to $1,998.13  Translated into 2016 dollars, 
the increase at private schools was from $11,441 to $17,611, while public 
law school resident tuition rose from $3,276 to $4,375.14  While these price 
changes between 1974 and 1986 were certainly striking, Kramer’s analysis 
did not capture the extent to which the 1974 figures already represented a 
massive run-up in costs from where they had been less than two decades 
earlier.15  By 1974, in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars, median tuition at 
private law schools was nearly three times higher than what tuition had been 
at the typical law school in 1956.  Indeed, by the mid-1970s, public resident 
 
 10  Kramer, supra note 1, at 240–41.   
 11  Id. at 242.   
 12  Id. at 242.   
 13  Id.   
 14  Id. at 242–43.   
 15  See Kramer, supra note 1, at 240, and accompanying text.  Kramer notes that Harvard 
Law School’s tuition underwent a nine-fold increase in nominal dollars between 1961 and 
1986.   
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tuition, in real dollars, was nearly as high as private law school had been in 
the mid-1950s. 
Kramer’s concerns regarding the long-term effects of this dizzying 
price spiral would likely have been even more pronounced if he could have 
foreseen what was to come.  In recent years, discussions about historical 
increases in law school tuition have tended to begin at the point where 
Kramer’s analysis ended, that is, in the mid-1980s.16  This is probably 
because the most easily accessible tuition statistics have been those 
published by the American Bar Association on its website, which, as of this 
writing, lists annual changes in law school tuition from 1985 through 2013.17  
As a result, such discussions tend to miss that by 1985, law school tuition 
had already increased several times over in constant dollars in the course of 
the previous thirty years.18 
In any case, by the 2016-2017 academic year, median tuition at private 
law schools had increased to $46,055.19  This represents, in constant dollars, 
a 162% increase since 1986, a 303% increase since 1974, and a 1,002% 
increase since 1956.  By the fall of 2016, sticker tuition at the average 
American private law school was, in real dollars, six times more expensive 
than Harvard Law School had been when current Supreme Court Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsberg attended that institution in the late 1950s.20  And yet 
even these numbers are dwarfed by the increase in public law school resident 
tuition, which has risen in constant dollars by 492% since 1986, 690% since 
1974, and 1,338% since 1956. 
We can better grasp the practical significance of this almost incredible 
price increase by placing it in the context of the American economy as a 
whole.  Let us use median family income as a proxy for measuring the 
relative affordability of an American legal education.21 
 
 16  See, e.g., Matt Leichter, ABA Regulations Don’t Cause Tuition Increases, Law Schools 
Do,-AMLAW-DAILY-(Dec.-22,-2011), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/12/ 
aba-regs-dont-cause-tuition-increases-law-schools-do.html.   
 17  See ABA, Statistics: Financial Information-Law School Tuition (1985-2013; 
Public/Private),-http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics. 
html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) [hereinafter ABA Statistics].   
 18  See Kramer, supra note 1, and accompanying text.   
 19  Author’s own calculation. Tuition figures taken from ABA Rule 509 Law School 
Disclosure Forms.  See also Law School Transparency, Tuition Tracker: Nominal Tuition 
Averages for ABA-approved schools, https://www.lawschooltransparency.com/ reform/
projects/Tuition-Tracker/ (showing $45,099 as the actual average annual tuition for private 
law schools in 2016 and noting that “private law school is now 2.7 times as expensive as it 
was in 1985 after adjusting for inflation”).   
 20  See also Kramer, supra note 1, and accompanying text.   
 21  I am using median family income, rather than the more commonly cited statistic of 
median household income.  Median family income tends to be about 20% higher than median 
household income.  The census defines a household as including persons living alone, while 
a family is defined as two or more people related by blood, marriage, or adoption living 
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In 1956, median law school tuition represented 9.9% of the median 
American family’s annual income.22  Median resident tuition at public law 
schools equaled 4.3% of the median family’s income.23 
By 1974, private law school tuition was equivalent to 18.2% of median 
family income, while public resident tuition was equivalent to 5.2% of that 
income.24 
Twelve years later, in 1986, private law school tuition now took up 
27.2% of median family income, and public resident tuition equaled 6.8% of 
that income.25 
By 2015, the most recent year for which data on family income are 
available, private law school tuition represented 64.3% of median family 
income, and public resident tuition was equivalent to 33.3% of that income.26 
Here is what the past sixty-year history of American law school tuition 
looks like in the context of changes in median family income, expressed in 
constant, inflation-adjusted dollars.27  First, the numbers for private schools: 
 
For private law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 2006, a family today has to make $88,200. 
 
For private law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1996, a family today has to make $109,500. 
 
For private law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1986, a family today has to make $169,000. 
 
For private law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1976, a family today has to make $253,000. 
 
 
together.  I am using the latter statistic, both because it is more representative of the social 
groups that typically deal with the financial issues raised by the cost of higher education, and 
because the census does not publish household income data from years prior to 1967.   
 22  See Historical Income Tables, Families, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-fam
ilies.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2017); Law School Transparency, Tuition Tracker: Nominal 
Tuition Averages for ABA-approved schools, https://www.lawschooltransparency.com/refo
rm/projects/Tuition-Tracker/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).   
 23  Id.   
 24  Id.   
 25  Id.   
 26  Id.   
 27  Here is an example of how these calculations are made:  In 1974, median resident 
tuition at public law schools was $673.  At that time, median family income was $12,902, so 
median resident tuition was 5.2% of median family income.  Because median resident tuition 
in 2016-2017 at public law schools is $23,540, a family at the income median would have to 
have an income of $453,000 for this to represent 5.2% of its income.   
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For average law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1956, a family today has to make $383,000. 
 
Here is the same analysis in the context of median resident tuition at public 
law schools28 : 
 
For public law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 2006, a family today has to make $105,000. 
 
For public law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1996, a family today has to make $189,000. 
 
For public law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1986, a family today has make $342,000. 
 
For public law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1976, a family today has make $453,000. 
 
For public law school tuition to be as affordable as it was for the 
typical family in 1956, a family today has to make $547,000. 
 
Several things are evident from these numbers.  First, the enormous 
run-up in private law school tuition between the mid-1950s and the mid-
1970s was to some extent ameliorated by the rapid rise in the income of 
American families during this time.  In the eighteen years between 1956 and 
1974, real median family income grew by nearly 50%—from $42,675 to 
$63,552—in 2017 dollars. 
Indeed, these same increases in family income mostly offset the rise in 
public law school tuition, which remained roughly as affordable as it had 
been two decades earlier, in relative terms.  Yet over the next four decades, 
law school tuition continued to rise at a breakneck pace, even as family 
income growth slowed to a crawl.  By 2015, median family income was just 
12.6% higher than it had been 41 years earlier, while private law school 
tuition had increased by 297% in constant dollars since then, and public law 
school resident tuition had risen by a mind-boggling 690%, even after 




 28  I am using “typical” in these examples to signify “median.” Median family income 
was $55,775 in 2015.  See KIRBY G. POSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME: 2015 
2 (Sept. 2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/ demo
/acsbr15-02.pdf.   
 29  Id.   
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Thus, the devastating consequences of rapidly increasing tuition and 
flat income growth are seen in their starkest form when considering the effect 
of these dual trends on the affordability of public legal education in 
particular.  When compared to family income, public law schools now cost 
considerably more than private law schools did as recently as the 1980s, let 
alone in the decades before then.  Resident tuition at public law schools is 
now higher, in real terms, than the tuition charged by Harvard and Yale law 
schools when a large percentage of today’s law professors attended the latter 
institutions.30 
Such a remarkable price history surely has a complex explanation, in 
which many factors have played a role.31  In this Article, I will focus on one 
possible cause for the gradual destruction of affordable legal education in 
contemporary America: the extent to which law school tuition has functioned 
as a Veblen good. 
III. THE CONCEPT OF A VEBLEN GOOD AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RECENT 
TUITION HISTORY OF ONE LAW SCHOOL 
The basic law of demand, taught in every introductory economics 
course, is straightforward: all other things being equal, as price increases, 
demand decreases, and vice versa.  Indeed, this law would appear to be 
practically axiomatic if one assumes that rational actors are maximizing their 
utility via their spending decisions. 
Once the introductory course is left behind or perhaps progresses to the 
latter stages of the semester, complications arise.  For our purposes, one such 
complication is particularly germane: the Veblen good.  A Veblen good is 
an item whose demand is proportionally rather than inversely related to its 
price.  In short, as the good’s price increases, demand increases as well, thus 
reversing the classic relationship between price and demand.32 
 
 30  See Paul Campos, Lawyers and Spoiled Identity, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 87 
(2015) (regarding the overwhelming relative percentage of Harvard and Yale law school 
graduates on law school faculties).   
 31  Some other likely factors in the extraordinary rise of law school tuition include: 
optimism and confirmation bias on the part of both applicants and law schools regarding the 
odds of graduates earning large salaries; federal educational loan policies that allow students 
to borrow the full cost of law school attendance with no control on what schools charge; the 
historical expectation of university administrators that law schools should cross-subsidize 
other departments with surplus tuition revenue; and pure rent-seeking on the part of both law 
schools and their parent universities, to name a few. For an explicit argument that the vast 
majority of law graduates receive an excellent return on their investment, and an all-but 
explicit argument that this in turn justifies rent-seeking via massive tuition hikes on the part 
of law schools, see Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014).   
 32  Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1992).  There is a 
small but growing literature on the various ways in which contemporary American higher 
education is beset by Veblen effects. See, e.g., Siva Vaidhyanathan, A Study in Total 
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Named after sociologist Thorstein Veblen who developed the theory of 
conspicuous consumption in The Theory of the Leisure Class, the Veblen 
good represents a potential problem for neoclassical economic theory.33  
Why would purportedly rational consumers pay more for something as its 
price increases?  Two explanations have been offered for this behavior. 
First, Veblen goods may be a reflection of the so-called “snob effect.”34  
The snob effect is a key factor in the market for luxury goods.  Such goods 
are purchased, in part, precisely because they are expensive, since owning 
them is a mark of economic status and higher economic status brings 
associated social prestige.  In markets where prestige signaling is a driving 
force, a good’s higher price is itself a key part of the quality that consumers 
are seeking by purchasing it, since they are thereby signaling that they can 
afford to make the purchase.  This is what Veblen termed “conspicuous 
consumption.”35 
Second, the existence of Veblen goods may be due in part to consumers 
treating price as a perfect or nearly perfect proxy for quality.36  In situations 
where consumers have little basis for making quality comparisons between 
competing goods and in which the consumers are one-shot players—that is, 
it is difficult or impossible for them to purchase more than one good of the 
relevant type—it can be reasonable for consumers to rely on price signals for 
most or all of their information about the quality of the goods in question and 
to make purchase decisions accordingly.  A related concept is the so-called 
common law of business balance, which asserts, in less technical terms, that 




Depravity, BAFFLER (July 2015), https://thebaffler.com/salvos/study-total-depravity.   
 33  THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899), http://moglen.law.
columbia.edu/LCS/theoryleisureclass.pdf.   
 34  Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of 
Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 189 (1950), http://areadocenti.eco.unicas.it/ bianchi/
LEIBENSTEIN.50.QJE.pdf.   
 35  In some cases, what appears to be a Veblen good may be an example of complete 
inelasticity of demand for a necessity, as opposed to a luxury good.  For example, consumers 
may purchase a life-saving medical treatment without regard to rising prices. If both the need 
for the treatment and its price are rising, demand for the good will have a proportional rather 
than inverse relationship to price.  In this situation, consumers are neither using price as a 
proxy for quality, nor engaging in conspicuous consumption, but demand for the product will 
still resemble that seen in the former circumstances.   
 36  Akshay R. Rao, The Quality of Price as a Quality Cue, 42 J. OF MKTG. RES. 401 
(2005).   
 37  The classic formulation of this principle, usually attributed (without any apparent 
basis) to John Ruskin, is: “[t]here is hardly anything in the world that someone cannot make 
a little worse and sell a little cheaper, and the people who consider price alone are that person’s 
lawful prey.”  See THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 657 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).   
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Of course these explanations are closely related to each other: 
consumers seeking prestige through conspicuous consumption may well 
consider the supposedly higher quality of the higher-priced good to be 
central to its snob appeal.38  Thus, some law school applicants may put 
significant weight on attending a prestigious school, not only for practical 
reasons such as the employment opportunities available to the school’s 
graduates, but also because of the snob appeal such schools have for them.  
Such applicants may then rationalize what others might consider a vain or 
contemptible concern with prestige for its own sake by convincing 
themselves that price and prestige are both excellent proxies for inherent 
quality. 
I suggest that both of these explanations and the relationship between 
them help account for the existence of the proportional rather than inverted 
demand curves, which have characterized the extraordinary increase in law 
school tuition over the past two generations. 
Let us examine a particularly stark individual example of this general 
price history.  Between the 1996-1997 and 2011-2012 application cycles, the 
University of Colorado Law School raised its resident tuition from $4,560 
per year to $31,114 per year.39  This was a far faster rate of increase than 
among law schools as a whole.  Over this same time, median private law 
school tuition rose from $17,785 to $39,184, while median public law school 
resident tuition increased from $5,269 to $19,376.40  Over the span of 15 
years, the average private law school tuition increased by 120.3% in nominal 
terms, and 57.2% in constant dollars, and average public resident tuition 
increased by 267.7% in nominal terms, and 162.4% in constant dollars.  
Meanwhile, Colorado’s tuition rose by 582.3% in nominal terms, and 
386.8% in constant dollars.  The school’s tuition had risen nearly seven times 
faster than the average rate of increase in private law school tuition, and 
nearly two-and-a-half times faster than average resident public school 
tuition. 
The general theory of demand holds that, all other things being equal, 
a competitor who raises its prices relative to its competition, and especially 
one who raises prices as drastically as Colorado did, will experience 
markedly reduced demand, as other competitors undercut it on price.  Let us 
 
 38  Cf. EDGAR SALTUS, OSCAR WILDE: AN IDLER’S IMPRESSION 20 (1917), https://archive.
org/details/oscarwildeanidl00saltgoog (“I have the simplest tastes. I am always satisfied with 
the best.”).   
 39  All law students at Colorado receive resident tuition no later than the beginning of 
their second year.  Throughout this article, “tuition” means tuition and mandatory fees.  All 
numbers were based on rates taken from the annual LSAC Official Guide to ABA Law 
Schools.  See LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA LAW SCHOOLS, https://officialguide.lsac.org/
release/OfficialGuide_Default.aspx.   
 40  See ABA Statistics, supra note 17.   
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consider what happened to the demand for potential admission to the 
University of Colorado Law School, both in absolute terms and relative to 
its competitors, nationally and locally. 
The table below lists the total applications to Colorado Law by year, 
from the 1995-1996 application cycle through the 2011-2012 cycle.  It then 
lists the total number of fall applicants who enrolled in the fall term at all 
ABA schools following that application cycle, and gives the percentage of 
those applicants who applied to Colorado Law.  Finally, it lists the tuition 
that Colorado Law charged in the academic year during which applicants 
applied for admission.41 
 
1995-1996:     2,292     84,305      2.72%     $4,323 
1996-1997:     1,846     76,687     2.41%      $4,560 
1997-1998:     1,731     72,340     2.39%     $4,953 
1998-1999:     1,836     71,726      2.56%     $5,410 
1999-2000:     1,947     74,380     2.62%     $5,917 
2000-2001:     2,239     74,550     3.00%     $5,917 
2001-2002:     2,907     77,235     3.76%     $5,917 
2002-2003:     3,132     90,853     3.45%     $6,352 
2003-2004:     2,899   100,585      2.88%     $7,645 
  2004-2005:     2,537     95,811      2.65%     $10,737 
  2005-2006:     2,517     88,681     2.84%     $13,546 
  2006-2007:     2,579     84,012      3.07%     $16,738 
  2007-2008:     3,000     83,397     3.60%     $18,594 
  2008-2009:     3,059     86,588      3.53%     $22,048 
  2009-2010:     2,906     87,921     3.31%     $25,399 
  2010-2011:     3,175     78,473      4.04%     $28,934 
  2011-2012:     2,801     67,914      4.13%     $31,114 
 
These figures indicate that, especially during the last third of this time 
period, tuition increases at Colorado Law that were far larger than those at 
other law schools correlated with large increases in applications to the 
school, in both absolute and relative terms.  In short, the more expensive 
Colorado Law became relative to other law schools, the more applications it 
received in comparison to schools that were rapidly becoming (relatively) 
less expensive.  This is the demand curve we would expect to see for a classic 
 
 41  Because law schools usually do not publish their tuition for an academic term until 
after the conclusion of the formal application cycle, applicants must rely on the published 
tuition rates for the previous year.  So, for example, someone applying for admission to a law 
school in the fall of 2012 could ascertain what tuition at the school was during the 2011-2012 
academic year, but would not know what tuition rates would apply at the time of the 
applicant’s potential enrollment.  It is a peculiarity of higher education that applicants apply, 
and indeed often enroll, without yet knowing the price of what they will be buying.  See supra, 
note 39.   
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Veblen good. 
Another striking aspect of the application market to Colorado Law 
during this time frame is that the school’s admissions standards rose 
markedly—again, both in absolute terms and relative to other law schools.  
In the late 1990s, when less than 2,000 people per year were applying to 
Colorado Law, the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentile LSAT scores of 
matriculants averaged 162, 160, and 158.42  By the end of the following 
decade, when applications to the school had risen by around 50% in both 
absolute and relative terms, those same percentiles had risen to 165, 164, and 
161.43  The boom in applications to Colorado that took place when the school 
radically raised prices also allowed it to raise the price of admission in terms 
of the entrance credentials that it demanded of applicants. 
Just how remarkable this state of affairs was is made clearer by focusing 
on the local, as opposed to the national, market for law school admissions.  
The State of Colorado has one other law school—the University of Denver.  
The two schools are only thirty-five miles apart, and both send the vast 
majority of their graduates into the Colorado legal market.  They are, in other 
words, direct competitors for potential applicants.  Furthermore, measuring 
the relationship between tuition increases and application totals at 
Colorado’s other law school helps control for the possibility that changes in 
applicant totals to the state’s law schools during this time frame were being 
driven by region-specific factors, such as the state’s economic growth. 
The table below records the University of Denver School of Law’s 
applicant totals, over the course of a decade during which the University of 
Colorado raised its law school tuition at a breakneck pace.  Again, 
application totals are expressed both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of all applicants in that application cycle.  This is followed by the tuition 
charged by the school during the application cycle year. 
 
2001-2002:     3,116     4.03%     $21,784 
2002-2003:     3,802     4.18%     $23,308 
2003-2004:     3,769     3.75%     $23,308 
2004-2005:     3,555     3.71%     $29,622 
2005-2006:     3,596     4.05%     $30,634 
2006-2007:     3,341     3.98%     $33,318 
2007-2008:     3,140     3.76%     $33,990 
2008-2009:     2,925     3.38%     $35,711 
2009-2010:     3,129     3.56%     $37,150 
2010-2011:     2,425     3.09%     $38,522 
 
 
 42  See supra, note 39.   
 43  Id. 
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In 2001-02, Denver received 7.2% more applications than Colorado, at 
a time when its tuition was 268.2% higher.  A decade later, the gap between 
the two schools’ tuition had shrunk drastically to 33.2%.  Yet despite losing 
the vast majority of what was at the beginning of the decade a massive 
comparative price advantage, Colorado was now receiving 30.7% more 
applications than Denver.  During this time, Colorado’s entrance 
requirements increased in both absolute terms and relative to Denver’s.  
Again, these are precisely the sorts of contrasting demand curves we would 
expect to see in the context of competing Veblen goods.  It would be difficult 
to formulate a starker contradiction of the general theory of demand. 
IV. VEBLEN GOODS AS EXPLAINED BY TUITION HISTORY IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
What could account for an enormous increase in tuition correlating with 
a large increase in applications, in both absolute and relative terms?  One 
explanation for the apparent existence of Veblen goods is that they are a form 
of conspicuous consumption: that people sometimes pay more for something 
precisely because it costs more, not despite that fact.  Former long-time 
George Washington University president Stephen Trachtenberg has been 
remarkably candid (and cynical) about his belief that higher education in 
contemporary America traffics in Veblen goods: 
 
Mr. Trachtenberg, however, understood something crucial about 
the modern university. It had come to inhabit a market for luxury 
goods. People don’t buy Gucci bags merely for their beauty and 
functionality. They buy them because other people will know they 
can afford the price of purchase. The great virtue of a luxury good, 
from the manufacturer’s standpoint, isn’t just that people will pay 
extra money for the feeling associated with a name brand. It’s that 
the high price is, in and of itself, a crucial part of what people are 
buying. 
 
Mr. Trachtenberg convinced people that George Washington was 
worth a lot more money by charging a lot more money. Unlike 
most college presidents, he was surprisingly candid about his 
strategy. College is like vodka, he liked to explain. Vodka is by 
definition a flavorless beverage. It all tastes the same. But people 
will spend $30 for a bottle of Absolut because of the brand. A 
Timex watch costs $20, a Rolex $10,000. They both tell the same 
time. 
 
The Absolut Rolex plan worked. The number of applicants surged 
from some 6,000 to 20,000, the average SAT score of students 
rose by nearly 200 points, and the endowment jumped from $200 
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million to almost $1 billion.44 
Did applications soar to the University of Colorado Law School 
because the school started charging luxury rather than bargain-brand prices?  
Is the upsurge in applicants explained by what economists call the “snob 
effect?” 
Law is a prestige-obsessed profession and legal academia reflects and 
reproduces this obsession in many ways.45  People who seek prestige and the 
social markers that signal it are probably more prone than average to behave 
in ways that illustrate the snob effect.  Some law school applicants, 
particularly those who are deeply concerned with various rankings of law 
schools and law firms and even with the “lay prestige” that schools and firms 
supposedly possess, may associate low cost with lack of prestige and high 
cost with its presence.46  All other things being equal, a law school that wants 
to attract such applicants will raise its prices, in the same way that a luxury 
brand will take care to avoid the appearance of offering its customers 
anything in the way of a price bargain.47 
Perhaps some applicants who were considering Colorado in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, at a time when the school’s tuition was a quarter of that 
being charged by private schools, saw this price gap not as evidence of a 
great potential bargain, but rather as a reflection of the traditional lack of 
prestige, relatively speaking, of low-cost public education in general—a 
prestige gap, which, for such applicants was emphasized precisely by the 
school’s low cost.  In sum, it is indeed possible that some of the upsurge in 
applications to Colorado when the school raised its prices to near private 
school levels was a product of the snob effect. 
 
 44  Kevin Carey, How to Raise a University’s Profile: Pricing and Packaging, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/education/edlife/how-to-raise-a-univer
sitys-profile-pricing-and-packaging.html?ref=education&_r=0&mtrref= www.lawyersguns
moneyblog.com&gwh=F9A49E69DB4AE20505DB63CD0768534A&gwt=pay&assetType
=nyt_now.  For a critique of the accuracy of Trachtenberg’s self-promoting claims, see Paul 
Campos, The First Rule of Journalism, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY BLOG (Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2015/02/first-rule-journalism.   
 45  See Campos, supra note 30.   
 46  “Lay prestige” refers to the perceptions of relative institutional prestige that non-
lawyers purportedly have of various law schools and law firms.  While it may seem incredible 
that law students and law school graduates would concern themselves with questions such as 
whether non-lawyers consider Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to be more or less prestigious than 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, for example, such people clearly do exist.  See 
How low would you go on Vault 100?, TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=23&t=269240&p=9557624 
&hilit=Sullivan+Cromwell+logo#p9557456.   
 47  Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of 
Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349 (June 1996), http://www.jstor.org/
stable/pdf/2118201.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aea10a2302119dbf26516f3c481f6f2f3 
(citation omitted) (“Our customers do not want to pay less.  If we halved the price of all our 
products, we would double our sales for six months and then we would sell nothing.”).   
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Another explanation for the existence of Veblen goods has had 
particular salience in the context of the demand for law school admission.  
Recall that another way of accounting for the existence of Veblen goods is 
to treat them as consequences of low-information consumption in one-shot 
purchasing scenarios.  When consumers have little basis for comparing the 
quality of goods, and when they can as a practical matter purchase the good 
in question only once, price may become the dominant heuristic for 
purchasing decisions.  This is especially the case in a society, such as ours, 
in which extreme forms of free market ideology often go so unchallenged 
that they end up being treated as self-evident truths.48  In such societies, the 
notion that the prices in an entire economic sector might have little to do with 
the actual quality of the goods sold in that sector will be highly counter-
intuitive. 
To test this hypothesis, let us consider what information was available 
to law applicants about law schools during the time period we are examining.  
There was not, and there still is not, any practical way for potential applicants 
to compare the quality of education provided by different law schools, other 
than to use extremely crude proxies (faculty-student ratio, volumes in the 
law library, and the like).  Furthermore, until very recently, only fragmentary 
information about initial employment outcomes for law graduates of specific 
law schools was available, while information about school-specific long-
term career outcomes was practically non-existent.49 
The dearth of information regarding the inherent quality of, or even the 
results associated with, the education provided by individual law schools, 
especially when considered in the light of the stupendous rise in the average 
cost of attendance at these institutions, helps explain the emergence of 
various schemes to formally rank law schools against each other.  In 
particular, the eventual dominance of the U.S. News rankings, so decried by 
practically everyone within legal academia itself, was a predictable outcome 
of the combination of severe information scarcity and skyrocketing costs that 
law school applicants faced in recent decades.50 
 
 
 48  For a general critique, see THOMAS FRANK, MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME 
CAPITALISM, MARKET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2001).  For an 
analysis of the remarkable influence Ayn Rand’s ideas in particular have had on contemporary 
American politics, see Jonathan Chait, Wealthcare, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 13, 2009), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/69239/wealthcare-0.   
 49  See Elie Mystal, Most Law Schools Would Like Law School Transparency to Just Go 
Away, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 14, 2010), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/09/most-schools-
would-like-law-school-transparency-to-just-go-away/.   
 50  See WENDY NELSON ESPELAND & MICHAEL SAUDER, ENGINES OF ANXIETY: ACADEMIC 
RANKINGS, REPUTATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 16–17, 105–06 (2016) (providing a good 
overview of the rise of educational rankings, and law school rankings in particular).   
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Yet the rankings themselves have turned out to be a very inadequate 
response to this problem.  As many people have pointed out, the rankings are 
at best a pseudo-scientific and self-referential exercise, which to some extent 
actually generate what they purportedly measure (which is, at bottom, 
institutional prestige).51  Worse yet, from the perspective of applicants 
attempting to investigate if they will get what they are being asked to pay 
for, the U.S. News rankings have used institutional spending as a proxy for 
educational quality.  In other words, if two law schools are otherwise 
identical in every respect, but one spends more money per student than the 
other, the higher spending school will be more highly ranked.  It would be 
difficult to construct a more perverse fiscal incentive structure.52 
Furthermore, in legal academia in particular, institutional prestige turns 
out to be extraordinarily sticky.  For example, since the U.S. News rankings 
became an annual ritual nearly three decades ago, the same fourteen law 
schools have been ranked in the top fourteen of the rankings every single 
year—a fact that by itself ought to discredit any notion that the rankings 
actually measure comparative institutional educational quality in any 
meaningful way.53 
All of which is to say that until about five years ago and the rise of the 
law school reform movement,54 the major sources of comparative 
information that law school applicants had available to them when 
considering the quality of various law schools were very fragmentary and 
often misleading, price, employment statistics, and law school rankings of 
obviously dubious value that almost always only fluctuated within rather 
than between pre-existing reputational bands.55 
Given the scarcity of meaningful comparative information available to 
applicants, using price as a proxy for institutional quality seems at least an 
arguably reasonable thing for applicants to have done.  This is especially true 
given the extent to which especially zealous forms of free market ideology 
have come to dominate American political discourse, particularly over the 
course of the past generation.56  In its extreme form, this ideological 
 
 51  See, e.g., Colin Diver, Is There Life After Rankings?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2005), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/is-there-life-after-rankings/304308/.   
 52  Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/articles/law-schools-methodology (explaining the current methodology for the 
rankings).   
 53  See Top Law School Rankings from US News, 7SAGE.COM (2016), https://7sage.com/
top-law-school-rankings/.   
 54  See infra note 63, and accompanying text.   
 55  Kyle P. McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward: Transparency at American Law 
Schools, 32 PACE L. REV. 1 (2012) (summarizing and critiquing the pre-reform movement 
situation).   
 56  See FRANK, supra note 48, and accompanying text.   
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orientation treats it as almost axiomatic that market transactions usually take 
place between rational, self-interested actors, who possess sufficiently 
symmetrical information and bargaining power to make those transactions 
efficient, wealth-maximizing exchanges.  Deviations from this norm are 
treated as rare “market failures,” usually caused by some violation of laissez-
faire principles, most typically various types of purportedly unjustified 
government intervention and regulation. 
A scene from the film Pulp Fiction dramatizes the sort of well-
functioning market that free market acolytes tend to treat as representative 
of almost all economic activity, at least in a properly deregulated society.  
The gangster Vincent Vega is taken aback when his companion, Mia 
Wallace, orders a $5 milk shake (which, since the film was released in 1994, 
would equal $8.19 in 2017 money).  “That’s a shake. That’s milk and ice 
cream. . . . That’s five dollars?” he asks incredulously. “You don’t put 
bourbon in it or nothing?” he asks the waiter.  “No,” the waiter replies.  When 
the drink arrives, he asks Mia for a sip, and is suitably impressed: 
“Goddamn! That’s a pretty fuckin’ good milkshake. . . . I don’t know if it’s 
worth five dollars, but it’s pretty fuckin’ good.”57 
Via its price, the seller of the milkshake signals to potential customers 
that it is an unusually high-quality product.  For a relatively small sum (or, 
in Vincent’s case, for “free,”58 since he asks for a sip of his companion’s 
drink), this signal can be evaluated immediately for accuracy, and if the 
product is judged to be reasonably priced, the satisfied customer is likely to 
purchase it again, and/or spread the word that it is indeed worth its high cost. 
The problem, of course, is that many economic transactions are far 
more fraught with informational deficits, and other practical difficulties, than 
buying high-end milkshakes.  Potential law school applicants cannot sample 
the product beforehand and until very recently, they had almost no basis for 
genuinely comparing even vaguely similar schools to each other.  They can 
make only one purchase, and it is essentially non-refundable. 
Law school is not a milkshake, but potential applicants are socialized 
within a culture that constantly repeats to them the mantra that “the market 
works” (subject again to rare exceptions, which tend to be dismissed via no 
true Scotsman-style argumentation).59  It is hardly surprising that under such 
 
 57  PULP FICTION (Miramax Films 1994).   
 58  As many observers have pointed out, gifts are only “free” in the formal, legal sense of 
the word.  See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION 15 (Cornell Univ. Press 1995).   
 59  The “no true Scotsman” fallacy involves making ad hoc exceptions to supposedly valid 
general statements.  So, for example, if it is pointed out that a certain market is beset by severe 
inefficiencies, it will be claimed that the market in question is not a “true” free market because 
of various purportedly illegitimate confounding factors.  Such distinctions between inefficient 
markets and “true” free markets must be made within an ideological frame in which free 
markets are by definition efficient.  See generally Fallacies, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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circumstances applicants have treated price as a reliable indicator of quality. 
This dynamic, I believe, is the key to understanding the remarkable rise 
in law school tuition.  The University of Colorado Law School provides a 
particularly sharp example of this phenomenon.  Colorado quintupled its 
tuition over the course of a decade—raising it seven times faster than private 
law school tuition rose over this time—and yet the school saw applications 
rise by 35% relative to applications nationally, and by even more relative to 
its only local competitor.  Note that over this time frame, the law school’s 
U.S. News ranking actually declined slightly and what little employment 
information was available to applicants did not indicate any discernable 
change in the outcomes students could expect when they graduated.  In other 
words, the only substantial piece of information applicants had that could (at 
least implicitly) explain or justify the school’s remarkable price increase 
relative to its competition, was the price increase itself. 
Note, too, that we can readily ask why applications to Colorado were 
so low in the late 1990s and early 2000s, rather than framing the question as 
why applications increased so much over the course of the decade.  In both 
cases the answer is the same, or at least is symmetrical: applicants apparently 
did not apply to Colorado at the beginning of this period because the school 
did not charge enough; they (or more precisely, their successors in the law 
school applicant pool), however, did apply a few years later because the 
school had become much more expensive and therefore, according to the 
logic of various extreme and politically influential versions of free market 
ideology, necessarily much better. 
V. A NEW ERA: AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR DECREASING 
LAW SCHOOL TUITION RATES 
Over the course of the present decade, the market for law school 
admissions has changed in a number of striking ways.  First, demand has 
plunged: while 87,900 people applied for fall admission to ABA law schools 
in 2010, by 2015 that figure had declined to 54,500.  Applicant totals fell 
again in 2016, and as of this writing, they are on track to decline for this 
year’s entering class.60 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/#NoTrueScotsman (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).   
 60  It is not possible to directly compare application totals from all the years prior to 2016, 
because the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) changed its reporting system in 2016 
to include applicants for admission to all terms.  In prior years, LSAC only reported applicants 
for the fall term.  Nevertheless, LSAC did record the all-term application totals in 2014 and 
2015.  The 2016 all-term total (56,500) was 0.9% lower than in 2015 and 2.9% lower than in 
2014.  The 2014 and 2015 fall term numbers had each featured the lowest applicant totals 
since at least 1983.  In regard to the 2017 cycle, as of August 8, 2017, LSAC reported that 
applicant totals were 0.1% lower than in 2016.   
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Second, information about employment prospects for new graduates, 
which most schools provided in only the most cursory—and sometimes 
misleading—form prior to 2012, has become far more detailed and 
revelatory.61 
Third, discounts on sticker tuition, which essentially did not exist prior 
to the 1990s and were on average still quite modest until a few years ago, 
became far more common and financially significant.62 
These trends are all closely related.  For more than fifty years, law 
schools had raised their tuition at a much faster pace than the rate of inflation, 
and this eventually generated significant backlash.  In particular, some 
people who are now bearing the immense financial burden that this trend 
created began to demand better answers to questions such as what sorts of 
employment outcomes a six-figure investment in law school tuition could 
expect to garner, and whether there was a good justification for law schools 
spending so much more money than they had been spending in the fairly 
recent past.  By the early years of this decade, such demands had coalesced 
into what I am calling the “law school reform movement.” 
The law school reform movement is a loose and informal network of 
law graduates, law students, legal academics, investigative journalists, and 
others who, in recent years, have exposed and criticized the status quo in 
legal academia.63  The movement’s initial focus was on pushing for more 
transparency about law school costs and especially law graduate 
employment outcomes.64  These efforts have produced significant 
 
 61  See ABA, Statistics: Employment, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ legal_
education/resources/statistics.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (listing law graduate 
employment data for years 2012 through 2016).  On the misleading reporting practices of law 
schools, see supra note 55, and accompanying text.   
 62  See infra note 67, and accompanying text.   
 63  Detailing the full contours of the law school reform movement is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  Very briefly, some key events in the initial formation of the movement include, 
in chronological order: the rise of law school “scam blogs” in the last few years of the previous 
decade; the early work of Bill Henderson, who first identified the problem of the bimodal 
salary distribution for new law graduates; the founding of the public interest organization Law 
School Transparency by two Vanderbilt law students, Kyle McEntee and Patrick Lynch; the 
2011 publication of a series of high-profile stories in The New York Times on problems in 
legal education; letters sent that year by Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Charles Grassley 
to the ABA, expressing concern about law schools publishing potentially misleading 
employment statistics, which convinced that organization to require schools to publish more 
reliable employment numbers; and the publication of Brian Tamanaha’s book Failing Law 
Schools in 2012. See generally Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 177 (2012).  This is a far from exhaustive list.   
 64  The fruits of these efforts can be witnessed most readily at Law School Transparency’s 
web site, which offers prospective students a host of tools for evaluating both projected costs 
and likely initial employment outcomes at each of the more than 200 ABA-approved schools.  
See Law School Transparency, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2017).   
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improvements in the quantity and quality of information available to 
prospective law students. 
Better information has meant that prospective students are less 
dependent on tuition price signaling the quality of education when 
comparing law schools to determine which school to attend.  It has also 
allowed applicants to force schools to engage in more vigorous competition, 
especially price competition, as they deal with a sharply contracting 
applicant pool.65  In short, the law school reform movement has helped 
transform the market for law school applicants into something that more 
closely resembles an efficient, well-functioning market.66  As a consequence, 
after many decades of non-stop increases, effective law school tuition—that 
is, the tuition that students really pay—is actually falling, for the first time 
in at least 60 years. 
The history of tuition discounting at American law schools is both brief 
and straightforward.  Prior to the 1990s, almost all law students paid sticker 
tuition.67  The small number that did not were beneficiaries of real 
scholarships, that is, of income streams from endowments set up for that 
purpose, which replaced some or all of the tuition that the students would 
have otherwise owed.  Law school scholarships in the traditional sense 
continue to be granted to students, but the vast majority of what law schools 
call “scholarships” are not scholarships in this sense at all, but rather cross-
subsidized discounts on sticker tuition. 
Here is a simplified example of how such discounts work.  Suppose that 
a hypothetical law school purportedly charges $40,000 per year in tuition, 
but it actually charges only half of its students this sum.  The other half of 
the student body is charged $20,000 per year.  The law school’s effective 
tuition—the amount it actually collects—is $30,000 per student.  The 
students who pay full price therefore subsidize the educational expenses of 
the students who pay half of the advertised sticker price. 
 
 65  For a wealth of information on tuition discounting, see generally Law School 
Numbers, http://lawschoolnumbers.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).   
 66  “More closely resembles” is not meant to imply a close resemblance in absolute terms, 
but rather a marked change from the previous status quo.  The question of which aspects of 
the law school reform movement have had what practical effects on legal academia is complex 
and difficult to answer.  Suffice it to say here that while correlation is not causation, the 
economic status quo for law schools has undergone a radical change since Brian Tamanaha 
observed in the Fall of 2011 that while many recent graduates were drowning in debt and 
struggling to find jobs, law schools themselves were not in crisis.  See Brian Tamanaha, Law 
Schools are Not in Crisis, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 31, 2011), https://balkin.blogspot.com/
2011/10/law-schools-are-not-in-crisis.html.  As this Article documents, that is certainly no 
longer the case—in no small part due to Tamanaha’s own pioneering work.   
 67  For example, in 1978-1979, ABA law schools distributed a total of $13,165,000 in 
scholarships to students.  See Kramer, supra note 1, at 243 n.18. I estimate that this 
represented approximately 4% of the cost of tuition at these schools at the time.   
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Effective law school tuition is the percentage of sticker tuition that 
students actually pay.68  Thirty years ago, effective tuition at ABA law 
schools equaled approximately 93% of advertised sticker tuition (and almost 
all of that 7% difference was accounted for by endowment income, i.e., real 
scholarships).69  Beginning in the 1990s, law schools became increasingly 
concerned with competing for students with high LSAT scores and 
undergraduate grade point averages because these metrics made up a 
significant part of the formula U.S. News employed to rank law schools.70  
This led to a limited amount of price competition in the form of discounts 
off sticker tuition. 
The history of tuition discounting at American law schools is both brief 
and straightforward.  Prior to the 1990s, almost all law students paid sticker 
tuition.71  The small number that did not were beneficiaries of real 
scholarships, that is, of income streams from endowments set up for the 
purpose, that replaced some or all of the tuition that the students would have 
otherwise owed.  Law school scholarships in the traditional sense continue 
to be granted to students, but the vast majority of what law schools call 
“scholarships” are not scholarships in this sense at all, but rather cross-
subsidized discounts on sticker tuition. 
But although these discounts crept slowly upward, they never came 
close to keeping pace with the rate at which sticker tuition was increasing.  
The result was that by 2012 effective tuition was now approximately 80% of 
sticker tuition, yet effective tuition had still increased by nearly 90% in real, 
inflation-adjusted terms since the advent of tuition discounting 
approximately 20 years earlier.72 
 
 68  Effective tuition is not exactly synonymous with sticker tuition minus discounts 
because effective tuition also reflects traditional scholarships, which use endowment income 
to replace tuition that would otherwise be paid by students.  The vast majority of the discount 
rate that makes up effective tuition, however, is accounted for by actual discounts off the 
advertised tuition rate rather than scholarship funds.   
 69  I calculated this sum by comparing the total dollar amount of scholarship aid given to 
law students in 1986-1987 to the sticker tuition charged by law schools that year.  See Kramer, 
supra note 1, at 243.   
 70  See ESPELAND & SAUDER, supra note 50.   
 71  For example, in 1978-1979, ABA law schools distributed a total of $13,165,000 in 
scholarships to students.  See Kramer, supra note 1, at 243.  I estimate that this represented 
approximately 4% of the cost of tuition at these schools at the time.   
 72  Sticker tuition rose by 110% in constant dollars between 1991 and 2012, while 
effective tuition rose by 87% in constant dollars over this time.  I calculated these figures by 
estimating total sticker tuition paid in each year and comparing it to the total dollar amounts 
of grants and scholarships made by law schools to students in that year.  The data on grants 
and scholarships can be found at ABA, Internal Grants and Scholarships Total Dollar Amount 
Awarded 1991-2012, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ legal_
education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/internal_grants_scholarships_awarded.auth
checkdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).   
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This was the point, approximately five years ago, when the law school 
reform movement began to have a discernable effect on both the quality of 
the economic information available to prospective law students, and not 
coincidentally, on the number of people applying to law school.  Faced with 
a rapidly shrinking and far better informed applicant pool made up 
increasingly of applicants who were willing and able to pit law schools 
against each other in a competition for their tuition dollars, law schools found 
themselves with no choice but to engage in what has now apparently become 
an all-out price war.73 
That price war remains invisible if one only looks at the sticker tuition 
law schools charge.  Yet at many law schools sticker tuition has over the past 
few years become an increasingly meaningless number.  This is because after 
decades of slow increases, tuition discounting in legal academia has 
suddenly taken a great leap forward.  Between 2011 and 2015, the average 
discount on sticker tuition at private ABA-approved law schools increased 
by more than 60%.74  In just four years, the average percentage discount off 
sticker tuition grew by as much as it had over the entire previous quarter 
century.  The result was that, while sticker tuition at private law schools grew 
by 16% between 2011 and 2015, average effective tuition actually declined 
by approximately 10.6%.  If we exclude elite schools—where effective 
tuition rose by an average of 9%—tuition declined by 12.5%.  After more 
than a half century of unbroken growth, law school tuition was finally going 
down: indeed, at many schools, by 2015 effective tuition rates had declined 
by 20% or more from their levels four years earlier.75 
 
 73 One can track the growing financial sophistication of prospective law students in regard 
to negotiating with law schools by comparing the advice given over time to applicants by law 
graduates and current students at the web site Top Law Schools. See generally TOP-LAW-
SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.top-law-schools.com/ (last visited July 27, 2017).   
 74 I calculated this figure by using the data published on ABA Rule 509 disclosure forms.   
 75 The change in effective tuition rates at private law schools in the state of New York 
between 2011 and 2015 captures the national pattern well:  
Albany:                             Down 21.1%






New York Law School: Down 18.8%
New York University: Up 9.3%
Pace: Down 28.3%
Syracuse: Down 37%
St. John’s: Down 20.6%
Touro: Down 10.7%
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And of course at many of those same schools, the decline in the per-
student tuition they were able to charge combined with a sharp drop in the 
total number of students they were able to enroll.  When combined with a 
22% decline in national enrollment between 2011 and 2015, the sudden drop 
in effective tuition resulted in total law school tuition revenue dropping by 
more than 30% in just four years.76 
One way of interpreting this reversal of a six-decade-long trend is that 
it was a result of the sudden waning of law schools’ ability to market their 
degrees as a Veblen good.  Recall that in the market for higher education 
credentials, such credentials can function as Veblen goods to the extent that 
applicants are pursuing prestige signaling, while depending on price to 
function as a supposedly accurate proxy for quality, in the absence of better 
sources of information. 
The law school reform movement has undercut both of these 
conditions.  By revealing the extent to which recent law graduates have 
struggled to find work (and in particular well-paying work) as lawyers, and 
by making clear how problematic the cost of law school has become in 
relation to the job opportunities recent graduates have had, the law school 
reform movement has helped puncture various cultural myths about the legal 
profession, myths that help shape perceptions regarding the profession’s 
prestige.77 
Even more significantly, the movement has led to the publication of 
much richer sources of relevant information for prospective students, who 
no longer need to rely on published tuition rates as (very misleading) proxies 
for the quality of the education and of the professional outcomes that various 
law schools provide.  The reform movement has also brought much more 
attention to the practice of tuition discounting, which means that prospective 
students—or at least those with enough cultural capital to find and take 
advantage of this information78—are in a better position to negotiate with 
schools.  The movement has also made it clear—again, to sufficiently 
sophisticated applicants—how remarkably eager (sometimes to the point of 
desperation) many law schools have become to negotiate with prospective 
 
 76  Enrollment data can be found at ABA, Statistics: Current Year Enrollment, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2017).  Note that all calculations in this Article are for JD students only.  Currently, 
11% of law students are enrolled in non-JD programs.  Effective tuition figures are not 
available for non-JD students.   
 77  See Campos, supra note 63.   
 78  This is a critical caveat.  Online discussions regarding the costs and benefits of 
attending various law schools reveal what appears to be an enormous range of financial 
sophistication, or lack of such sophistication, among potential law school applicants.  For 
many representative examples, see Choosing a Law School forum, TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM 
http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewforum.php?f=1 (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).   
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enrollees.79 
This new pressure to compete for students that law schools began to 
feel with the advent of the rankings culture in the 1990s has been intensified 
greatly by the recent sharp decline in applicants and the growing 
sophistication applicants bring to the process of negotiating with law 
schools.  These changes, which are in large part due to the efforts of the law 
school reform movement, have finally stopped and indeed reversed, the 
seemingly inexorable climb in the average cost of attending law school.80 
In sum, law school tuition is ceasing to be a Veblen good.  Instead, the 
general theory of demand—which asserts that, everything else being equal, 
consumers will always prefer a lower price to a higher price—is finally 
asserting itself as the dominant force in the increasingly fierce competition 
for increasingly scarce law school applicants. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conclusions that this Article raise produces at least as many 
questions as they answer.  For example, to what extent does the history of 
law school tuition over the past 60 years throw light on the costs of American 
higher education in general?  Will the current decline in average real law 
school tuition continue or accelerate?  If so, how many law schools will be 
able to tolerate losses in tuition revenue that, at least at non-elite schools, 
have already reached an average of perhaps 35% over the past five years?81  
What are the implications, for the legal profession and society as a whole, of 
a tuition discounting system that is becoming ever-more pervasive and 
intense?  Note that it is now the case that around half of all law students pay 
either sticker tuition or something close to that, while those students whose 
legal educations are subsidized by the former group pay tuition that, in real 
dollars, is similar to tuition rates 20 or 30 years ago.  Given that those paying 
full price are both disproportionately poorer and more likely to be members 
of ethnic minority groups than those they subsidize, this “reverse Robin 
Hood” system should trouble anyone concerned about the ways higher 
education can reinforce rather than break down existing class and race 
hierarchies.82 
 
 79  Based on messages I have received from prospective law students seeking advice, I 
have concluded that it is now apparently common at many law schools for the school’s dean—
not the school’s dean of admissions, but the dean of the entire law school—to make what are 
essentially sales calls to admitted applicants.   
 80  The only class of schools that continues to raise real tuition consists of elite national 
institutions, who for the most part compete only with each other.  In 2015, effective tuition 
was 9% higher at these schools than it had been in 2011.   
 81  While effective tuition figures are not yet available for 2016-2017, total JD enrollment 
was down 2.6% from the previous year.  See supra, note 75. 
 82  See Law School Survey of Student Engagement, 2016 Annual Survey Results: Law 
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All these questions deserve further close investigation.  This initial 
foray into the (disappearing?) world of law school credentials as Veblen 
goods merely suggests how complex the political economy of law school 
education, and of American higher education in general, may ultimately 
prove to be. 
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